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I.

INTRODUCTION

I
W
I

t is a regrettable truth that when States find it impossible to resolve their
differences by diplomatic interaction, they resort all too often to the use of
violence. In the resulting contest, the State with access to the most advanced
technology will frequently have a considerable advantage. The contest may
take place in any of the known environments: land, sea, airspace, cyberspace
and outer space. While the modern era is not without its tensions between
States, and while some of these tensions give rise to hostilities, there seems
to be a welcome reluctance to extend these hostilities to outer space. That
possibility cannot be ruled out, however, and it is doubtful that the reluctance
is based in any sense on a taboo as to the deployment of weapons to, or their
use in, outer space. There is, at least in some quarters, a recognition that the
employment of weapons, particularly kinetic weapons, in space is likely to
contribute further to the pressing debris problem, and space-to-ground operations, though theoretically feasible, are perceived as being unnecessarily
costly and comparatively less reliable than air-to-ground, littoral or landbased solutions.1 Moreover, there remains the possibility of other, less kinetic or non-kinetic kinds of offensive operation in outer space. So the awful
possibility of warfare in outer space cannot be excluded, and if it were to
become a reality, it is important to know the rules that would apply. Accordingly, this article concerns itself with the law that would determine which
weapons it would be lawful for a State to employ in that environment.
To accomplish that task it is necessary to understand the general legal
principles with which all weapons are required to comply, some treaty-based
rules that address the natural environment, the customary and treaty provisions that deal with relevant weapon technologies and the particular provisions of space law that are concerned with weapons. These rules constitute
the criteria against which the legal acceptability of a new space weapon must
be judged, so it is those rules that States must apply when undertaking the
obligatory legal reviews of all new space weapons.

1. DAVID WRIGHT, LAURA GREGO & LISABETH GRONLUND, THE PHYSICS OF SPACE
SECURITY: A REFERENCE MANUAL 6 (2005). The reduced reliability is stated to be at least
partly due to the inability to maintain space-based systems. Id. at 8–9.
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Outer space is of critical importance for numerous vital functions in the
modern world.2 In the military context, these include anti-ballistic missile
operations, long-range precision strike and ground-based mid-course missile
defense missions,3 intelligence,4 communications and navigation activities.
Were hostilities to break out in outer space, they seem likely to take a variety
of forms. They would probably include the direct attack, shading of, or interference with, space assets, such as satellites, using physical,5 laser or cyber
techniques; electronic attack in the form of jamming or spoofing; physical
or cyber interference with the movement of targeted space vehicles; laser
blinding; and electromagnetic pulse attack.6 The interception in outer space
of transiting missiles is another likely example. Any understanding of the
words “weapon” as used in the title of this article and “weaponization” must,
therefore, be discussed in the context of these kinds of activity.
Part II will consider and explain the meanings of some important terms
in the law relating to weapons. Part III will outline the superfluous injury/unnecessary suffering and indiscriminate weapons principles. Then in Part IV,
two rules that seek to protect the natural environment during armed conflict
will be explained. Part V will briefly note the ad hoc rules of weapons law
that might be of relevance to present and foreseeable space weapon technologies. Part VI will address the rules of space law that are relevant to weapons,
2. The Multinational Experiment 7 Access to Global Commons report refers to four
space pillars to describe the types of capability that space can provide, namely position,
navigation and timing; satellite communications; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; and space situational awareness. PROTECTING ACCESS TO SPACE ¶ 114 (Joint StaffMN//ACT Integration 2013), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=754742. As to the wider
military and civilian utility of facilities provided from outer space, see UNITED KINGDOM
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, DEVELOPMENT, CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINE CENTER, SPACE: DEPENDENCIES, VULNERABILITIES AND THREATS (2012), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/multinational-experiment-7-space-dependencies-vulnerabilities-and-thr
eats. For commercial uses of space, see David A. Koplow, ASAT-isfaction: Customary International Law and the Regulation of Anti-Satellite Weapons, 30 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1187, 1190–94 (2009).
3. As to the military utility of space, see Michael N. Schmitt, International Law and Military
Operations in Space, 10 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 89, 94–98
(2006); UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, DEVELOPMENT, CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINE CENTER, JDP 0-30, UK AIR AND SPACE DOCTRINE ¶¶ 508–15 (2013).
4. Consider the improved ground resolution achieved in recent decades. Koplow, supra
note 2, at 1195.
5. This could take the form of using a satellite to interfere with the command and
control channel of another satellite, for example, by interrupting health and status reports
and impeding the ability to send commands to the satellite.
6. PROTECTING ACCESS TO SPACE, supra note 2, ¶¶ 123–27.
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principally in Articles III and IV of the Outer Space Treaty, and Part VII will
look at the weapon review obligations of States under Article 36 of Additional Protocol I and under an implied rule for States that are not party to
Additional Protocol I. Part VIII will take the criteria that States should address in a weapon review and assess how they may apply in relation to a
representative sample of space weapon capabilities. Part IX concludes the
discussion.
II.

DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of this article, a weapon is a device, system, munition, implement, substance, object or piece of equipment that is used, intended or
designed to cause injury or damage to an adverse party in an armed conflict.7
The term “means of warfare” refers to weapons and weapon systems,8
whereas a “method of warfare” is an activity designed to adversely affect the
enemy’s military operations or military capacity.9
Taking the examples of space capabilities discussed in Part I, a projectile,
space vehicle or laser that is used kinetically to attack a space vehicle, thereby
causing damage to it, is a weapon by virtue of that use. If a space vehicle
undertaking rendezvous and proximity operations is used to cause another
space vehicle to move out of position or out of orbit and thus causes the
targeted vehicle to be unable to perform its normal functions either permanently or until a repair is effected, this activity damages the targeted vehicle
by virtue of the degradation or termination of its ability to perform its assigned tasks, so the instrument that is used to achieve such an effect must be
classified as a weapon, due to the use to which it has been put. Moreover,
and as a discrete matter, if the activity is “designed to adversely affect the

7. Justin McClelland, The Review of Weapons in Accordance with Article 36 of Additional Protocol I, 85 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 397 (2003). Weapons are described
in the HPCR Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare as “a means of
warfare used in combat operations, including a gun, missile, bomb or other munitions, that
is capable of causing either (i) injury to, or death of, persons; or (ii) damage to, or destruction
of, objects.” PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, MANUAL
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE 6 (2009) [hereinafter
AMW MANUAL].
8. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 1 (2d ed. 2010).
9. AMW MANUAL, supra note 7, r. 1(v).
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enemy’s military operations or military capacity” it will amount to a method
of warfare.10
The shading or other interference with an enemy’s space assets, such as
satellites, with the purpose of adversely affecting the enemy’s military operations will, for the same reasons, amount to a method of warfare. Whether
the devices or techniques that are used to have such an effect constitute
weapons will depend on the precise mechanism or system that is used and
on the precise permanent or temporary effects they have on the targeted
space vehicle. That mechanism or system may consist of a laser or electromagnetic pulse, a cyber tool or an electronic capability involving jamming.
If the mechanism or system causes physical damage to the targeted satellite
or if it degrades or terminates the functioning of the satellite, either permanently or so that repair is necessary to restore that functioning, these effects
amount to damage and the mechanism or system so employed will be a
weapon. Likewise, if what is done to the targeted satellite causes injury or
damage to persons or objects that rely on the services that the targeted satellite provides, the mechanism or system will also by virtue of those effects
be classified as a weapon. Any such technique that does not cause damage
or injury, but that adversely affects enemy military operations or capacity,
will, as explained above, constitute a method of warfare.
The interception in outer space of missiles in transit, for example during
the boost phase or mid-course, may be undertaken by kinetic, laser or perhaps in the future by cyber means. For obvious reasons, such activities
amount to a method of warfare. If, as is assumed, the purpose of the operation is to cause the intercepted missile to be destroyed, thereby preventing it
from achieving its originally intended task, the interception mechanism
would also amount to a weapon. All of the systems that have been classified
as weapons in the foregoing discussion will also be means of warfare, which,
as noted earlier, comprise weapons and weapon systems.
The analysis has so far been referring somewhat glibly to “outer space”
without specifying what exactly that concept means. There is no precise internationally agreed definition of the altitude(s) from the earth’s surface at
which outer space begins and airspace ends, but a widely accepted approach
is that outer space begins above the highest altitude at which an aircraft can
derive lift from its interaction with the air and below the lowest possible
perigee of an earth satellite in orbit. Accordingly, anything that is in orbit is

10. Id.
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in outer space.11 A weapon is, for the purposes of this article, a “space
weapon” if it operates entirely in outer space. Space weapons do not, therefore, include intercontinental ballistic missiles as these are only in outer space
for part of their trajectory and do not go into orbit. Outer space weapons,
however, may be located on land, under or on the surface of the sea or in
airspace, but they must have their operational effect in outer space.12 In addition, weapons that are located in and operate from outer space and that
have their operational effect in outer space, in airspace, in cyberspace, on or
under the earth’s surface are space weapons.
III.

THREE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF WEAPONS LAW

Having clarified the relevant terminology, the three fundamental customary
principles in the law relating to weapons will be addressed. The first of these
has its origins in 1874 when the authors of the Brussels Declaration acknowledged the notion that “[t]he laws of war do not recognize in belligerents an
unlimited power in the adoption of means of injuring the enemy.”13 This idea
was adopted in treaty form in the Hague Regulations of 189914 and 1907,15
and in Article 35(1) of Additional Protocol I (API).16 The principles considered in the present Part and the rules discussed in Part IV constitute the
limitations to which the Brussels Declaration notion is indirectly referring.

11. U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. COAST GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 512/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS ¶ 1.10 (2007) [hereinafter COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK]; UNITED KINGDOM
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 12.13 (2004)
[hereinafter UK MANUAL]; AMW MANUAL, supra note 7, r. 1(a).
12. Thus, a laser weapon that is located on land, but which is designed to engage targets
in outer space would come within this definition of space weapon.
13. Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War
art. 12, Aug. 27, 1874, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 23 (Dietrich Schindler
& Jiri Toman eds., 4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter Brussels Declaration].
14. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 22, annexed to
Convention No. II with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899,
32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403.
15. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 22, annexed to
Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Regulations].
16. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter API].
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In short, international law both provides that there are limits to the lawful
ways of injuring the enemy and specifies what those limits are.
The precise language that is used in the following principles and rules is
important as it defines the prohibitions and restrictions to which States have
been able to agree, and thus the extent of the law’s reach.
The second principle prohibits the employment of weapons, projectiles,
and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury
or unnecessary suffering. This is a cardinal principle of the law of armed
conflict,17 which is expressed in the 1907 Hague Regulations as a prohibition
of the employment of “arms, projectiles or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.”18 In its most recent and authoritative treaty articulation,
the rule prohibits the employment of “weapons, projectiles and material and
methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering.”19 It is a customary rule that binds all States in relation to international and non-international armed conflicts.20 The rule first appeared in the
preamble to the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868.21
The principle requires a comparison of the wounding effect, injury and
other suffering resulting from the use of the weapon, but does not explicitly
specify the comparator. Given that weapons are used in order to achieve a
military advantage or purpose during armed conflict, the superfluous injury/unnecessary suffering test involves comparing the nature and scale of
the generic military advantage to be anticipated from the weapon in the application(s) for which it is designed to be used, with the pattern of injury and
suffering associated with the normal intended use of the weapon.22 While the
17. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
Rep. 226, ¶¶ 74–87 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons].
18. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 15, art. 23(e).
19. API, supra note 16, art. 35(2). The corresponding language in the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court is found in Article 8(2)(b)(xx). Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
20. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW r. 70 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter CIHL].
21. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under
400 Grammes Weight pmbl. paras. 3–6, Nov. 29/Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297, 18
MARTENS NOUVEAU RECUEIL (ser. 1) 474, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS,
supra note 13, at 91 [hereinafter St. Petersburg Declaration]; GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 269–72 (2011).
22. See W. J. Fenrick, The Conventional Weapons Convention: A Modest but Useful Treaty, 279
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 498, 500 (1990); W. Hays Parks, Means and
Methods of Warfare, 38 GEORGE WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 511, 536 n.25
(2006).
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application of the principle involves the assessment of phenomena such as
suffering, injury and military utility that are hard to measure and difficult to
compare, a weapon is not rendered unlawful merely because it causes severe
injury, suffering or loss of life. It is the injury or suffering inevitably caused
by the weapon in its normal or designed circumstances of use that must be
disproportionate to its military purpose or utility for the rule to be broken.
Due account must be taken of comparable lawful weapons in current use
when making that assessment.23
As this discussion has shown, the principle is concerned with the effects
of a weapon on personnel and is therefore unlikely, for the foreseeable future, to be relevant to outer space weapons if their effects only occur in outer
space. If, as presently seems unlikely,24 a weapon were to be developed that
is located in outer space but has, or is designed or intended to have, injurious
effects on persons on the earth’s surface or elsewhere, the superfluous injury/unnecessary suffering principle will have to be considered in any legal
review of the weapon.25
The third principle prohibits the employment of weapons that are of a
nature to be indiscriminate. This is a development of the principle of distinction that requires parties to the conflict at all times to distinguish between
combatants and civilians and between military objectives and civilian objects
and only to direct their military operations against combatants and military
objectives.26 The jurists who drafted the Hague Draft Rules of Aerial Warfare, a text that was never adopted by States and that is not in any formal
sense a source of law, produced the first iteration of an indiscriminate attacks
rule in Article 24(3).27 A treaty-based rule prohibiting indiscriminate attacks
23. See Parks, supra note 22.
24. See WRIGHT, GREGO & GRONLUND, supra note 1.
25. As to the obligation to review new weapons, means and methods of warfare, see
infra Part VII.
26. See U.S. Department of War, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the
United States in the Field arts. 14, 15, 22, General Orders No. 100, Apr. 24, 1863 [hereinafter
Lieber Code]; St. Petersburg Declaration pmbl., supra note 21; Brussels Declaration, supra
note 13, arts. 12, 13, 15, 17; 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 15, arts. 23(g), 25, 27. The
modern formulation of the principle of distinction is to be found in API, Articles 48, 51 and
52. See API, supra note 16, arts. 48, 51–52.
27. Article 24(3) of the Rules concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time
of War and Air Warfare asserted that in cases where objectives cannot be bombarded without the indiscriminate bombardment of the civilian population, “the aircraft must abstain
from bombing.” Rules concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and
Aerial Warfare art. 24(3), Feb. 19, 1923, 32 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Supp.) 12 (1938), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 13, at 315.
186

Space Weapons and the Law

Vol. 93

and indiscriminate weapons did not appear until 197728 when API was
adopted. In API, Article 51(4) prohibits indiscriminate attacks, i.e., those
which:
(a) . . . are not directed at a specific military objective;
(b) . . . employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at
a specific military objective; or
(c) . . . employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot
be limited as required by th[e] Protocol;
and [which], consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.29

It is sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) that constitute the indiscriminate weapons principle, in that they prohibit weapons, which either because they cannot be directed at a specific military objective or their effects cannot be limited, essentially do not distinguish as required by the principle of distinction.30 Thus, a space weapon is unlawful if, when used in its normal or designed circumstances, it cannot be directed at a specific military objective or
if its effects cannot be reasonably restricted to the target, and, if as a result,
its nature is to strike lawful targets, such as military objectives, and protected
persons and objects without distinction. Any weapon is capable of being
used indiscriminately. The weapons law rule is concerned with the inherent
characteristics of the weapon, as opposed to the particular activities of its
user.
Applying the principle to outer space weapons, it should be noted that
kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles may contribute to the accumulation of
debris in outer space31 and to the resulting problems that debris causes.32 At
28. Neither Article 27 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, nor Article 5 of the 1907 Hague
Convention IX explicitly addresses indiscriminate attacks. Convention No. IX Concerning
Bombardments by Naval Forces in Time of War, Oct 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2351, T.S. No. 542.
29. The discrimination rule in Article 51(4) of API is an important element in complying
with the principle of distinction. See API, supra note 16, art. 51(4).
30. Consider this statement from the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion: “States must
never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are
incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets.” Nuclear Weapons, supra note
17, ¶ 78.
31. PROTECTING ACCESS TO SPACE, supra note 2, ¶ 102. Note that concentrations of
debris have reached a level that risks generating a chain reaction that would deny access to
entire areas of outer space. Id. ¶ 103. See generally Koplow, supra note 2, at 1202–08.
32. See PROTECTING ACCESS TO SPACE, supra note 2, ¶ 121. Consider in that regard the
debris reportedly caused by the Chinese anti-satellite test attack on January 11, 2007.
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the root of the problem is the damaging effect of fragments in outer space,
which is attributable to the high speeds at which objects travel in orbit and
the tendency for such fragments to remain in orbit, particularly if they are
above certain altitudes. An outer space weapon that is designed to kill a satellite by a kinetic impact in medium to high orbit would inevitably create a
cloud of debris. That debris can be expected to remain in orbit for a protracted period, if not indefinitely. The individual fragments would be likely
to cause damage to any space vehicles, whether civilian or military, and
whether they belong to the adverse party to the armed conflict or to a neutral, that happen to pass through the affected area. Any State considering the
use of such a method of anti-satellite operation would need to give most
careful consideration to the indiscriminate weapons rule and to the proportionality rule as reflected in Article 51(5)(b)33 of API. Indeed, from a strictly
weapons law perspective, it is arguable that such a method of warfare, by
virtue of its inherently indiscriminate expected effects, may breach Article
51(4)(c) of API if, for example, the method is employed in parts of outer
space where the likelihood of interference with other protected space vehicles is high.34 Moreover, the potential impact on neutral States of the use of
such a method of warfare would have to be assessed and considered.

Koplow, supra note 2, at 1203, 1211. On February 20, 2008, the United States conducted a
ballistic missile test attack on its falling USA-193 satellite at a low altitude of 150 miles; most
of the 3,000 potentially hazardous fragments reportedly left orbit. Id. at 1210. See also Brian
Weeden, Through a Glass, Darkly: Chinese, American and Russian Anti-satellite Testing in Space,
SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION (Mar. 17, 2014), https://swfound.org/media/167224/thr
ough_a_glass_darkly_march2014.pdf.
33. Article 51(5)(b) of API describes an indiscriminate, and thus prohibited, attack as
“an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.” API, supra note 16, art. 51(5)(b).
34. Koplow, supra note 2, at 1245; see also id. at 1248. But see Michel Bourbonnière &
Ricky J. Lee, Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello Considerations on the Targeting of Satellites: The Targeting of Post-Modern Military Space Assets, 44 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 167, 198
(2014) (noting that where the argument is made the focus should be on the former rather
than the latter rule). The proportionality rule is, however, an example of the indiscriminate
attack rule. A kinetic anti-satellite weapon might be designed to operate in both higher and
lower orbits. If operated in low orbit, the resulting debris might not necessarily form a persistent cloud so the use of the weapon might not be rendered indiscriminate by virtue of the
debris that the impact causes. Accordingly, such a weapon might not be regarded as indiscriminate by nature. It should, however, be recalled that all of the consequences inevitably
associated with the use of a weapon in its normal designed applications should be considered in determining whether it is indiscriminate by nature.
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Another aspect of the indiscriminate weapons rule arises when one considers that a single satellite may host a number of networks or links each of
which may carry both civilian and military communications traffic. Such a
dual-use satellite would be a military objective by virtue of the military function(s) that certain of its networks or links perform. A commander planning
to attack such a satellite would have to consider whether the injury to civilians and the damage to civilian objects, including the civilian links hosted by
the satellite, are such that an attack may be expected to cause injury and
damage that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated from the attack. That is a targeting law determination
that is made by reference to the facts of a particular attack.
The weapon review would likely conclude that the weapon is not per se
inherently indiscriminate, if it is capable of engaging a specific military objective such as a military satellite and of limiting its damaging or injurious
effects to that specific military satellite. The weapon review will, however,
need to explain the proportionality issues that are liable to arise when, for
example, dual-use satellites are made the object of attack and will likely discuss feasible precautions that should be adopted to seek to ensure that indiscriminate attacks do not take place. However, mere inconvenience or annoyance caused to civilians due to degraded service from civilian communications, broadcasting, navigation or other facilities attributable to interference with particular satellites and/or their networks would not need to be
considered in the proportionality analysis.
If, when the space weapon is being developed or acquired, it is clear that
likely uses of it will have the incidental effect of closing down or degrading
civilian nodes or networks causing injury to civilians and/or damage to civilian objects, a legal review of the weapon should draw attention to the requirement for a careful proportionality assessment before its use. The review
may need to consider alternative methods of achieving the same generic military purpose, and, depending on the circumstances, these might, for example, include temporarily placing the satellite in shadow or using cyber tools
directed at the specific network or link that is the object of the attack.35

35. Only incidental death, injury, damage or destruction would fail to be considered in
such a proportionality assessment. For the different operating arrangements to which dualuse satellites may be subject and their implications for targeting, see Bourbonnière & Lee,
supra note 34, at 205–16. Duncan Blake explores the possibilities of disrupting an enemy
satellite or converting it to its own use and discusses the use of terrestrially-based capabilities
to target ground stations or links to the space-based object, for example, by using electronic
189
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The indiscriminate weapons principle is customary, binding all States irrespective of whether they are party to API, and applies in both international
and non-international armed conflicts.36
IV.

WEAPONS LAW RULES RELATING TO THE ENVIRONMENT

There are two rules in relation to the environment that may be relevant when
new space weapons are being considered. The first rule deals with damage
caused to the natural environment by military activities in armed conflict.
The precise form of the rule depends on whether the relevant State is a party
to API. For States that are not party to API, customary law treats the natural
environment as a civilian object, which as such enjoys general protection
from attacks and their effects. As a civilian object, the natural environment
may not be made the object of attack and may not be subjected to wanton
destruction.37 This rule is concerned with direct damage to the natural environment, whether as the intended or as the incidental outcome of a military
operation. 38 Accordingly, when procuring weapons, all States must have due
regard to the impact they may be expected to have on the natural environment.39
For States party to API, Article 35(3) prohibits the use of methods or
means of warfare that are intended or may be expected to cause widespread,
long-term and severe damage to the natural environment, while Article 55(1)

warfare or cyber methods. Duncan Blake, Military Strategic Use of Outer Space, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 97, 109 (Hitoshi Nasu & Robert McLaughlin eds., 2014).
36. CIHL, supra note 20, r. 71, at 244. In relation to international armed conflicts, see
also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 19, art. 8(2)(b)(xx).
37. AMW MANUAL, supra note 7, rr. 88, 89; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS r. 143(a) (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2017).
The U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Manual notes the “United States has not accepted
these provisions [Articles 35(3) and 55 of API]” and concludes that they are “overly broad
and ambiguous” and “not a part of customary law,” while also expressing the view that “use
of such weapons is prohibited only if their use is clearly excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct overall military advantage anticipated.” OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 6.10.3.1 (Dec. 2016) (citation omitted) [hereinafter DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL]. While the way in which the Manual expresses
the point can be criticized, it is clear that the United States regards environmental damage
as only prohibited when it breaches proportionality.
38. DINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 209–12.
39. AMW MANUAL, supra note 7, r. 89.
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prohibits such methods or means that thereby prejudice the health or survival of the population. The terms “widespread, long-term and severe” apply
cumulatively, so if any one of the criteria is absent, the treaty provision will
not have been breached. API contains no definition of widespread, longterm and severe, but only the most serious of damage will breach the rule.40
A number of States when ratifying API made statements excluding the application of, inter alia, this rule to nuclear weapons. The United States is not
a party to API and explicitly rejects these provisions.41
These rules will potentially apply to any space weapon that is designed
to have direct or indirect destructive effects on land or in airspace. While the
threshold for breaching the API rule is high and significant environmental
damage is likely to be necessary before the wanton damage rule would be
engaged, the rules applicable to the particular State should be considered in
respect of any relevant space weapon.
States party to the Environmental Modification Convention (ENMOD)
are prohibited from engaging in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State party
to that Convention.42 It is the definition of the term “environmental modification techniques” as “any technique for changing – through the deliberate
manipulation of natural processes – the dynamics, composition or structure
of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere,

40. See 15 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN
ARMED CONFLICTS 268 (1978), reprinted in COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 1454 (Yves
Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987)
The time or duration required (i.e., long-term) was considered by some to be measured in
decades. References to twenty or thirty years were made by some representatives as being a
minimum. Others referred to battlefield destruction in France in the First World War as
being outside the scope of the prohibition. It appeared to be a widely shared assumption
that battlefield damage incidental to conventional warfare would not normally be proscribed
by this provision. What the article is primarily directed to is thus such damage as would be
likely to prejudice, over a long term, the continued survival of the civilian population or
would risk causing it major health problems.

41. See supra note 37.
42. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques art. I, May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151.
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or of outer space” 43 that demonstrates its relevance to the present discussion.
So, to come within the prohibition:
1. the dynamics, composition or structure of outer space must have
been changed;
2. natural processes must have been manipulated to achieve such an
effect;
3. the manipulation must have been deliberate;
4. the use of the technique must have been military or hostile in nature;
5. widespread, long-lasting or severe effects must have resulted;
6. those effects must have been the means of causing destruction, damage or injury to another State; and
7. both States must be party to the Convention.
Because ENMOD only applies if the destruction, damage or injury is
caused to another State party, its application is effectively limited to international armed conflicts between States party. Environmental modification
would include an attempt to modify the weather by either increasing or reducing rainfall in an area to bring about floods or drought.44 The results of
environmental modification may include earthquakes, tsunamis, a disturbance in the ecological balance of a region, changes in weather and climate
patterns.45 So any technique or weapon operating in or from outer space that
is used to trigger environmental modification that produces the prohibited
damage and effects is likely to breach the treaty.
V.

AD HOC RULES OF WEAPONS LAW

International law includes rules that prohibit the use of certain weapons or
weapon technologies. Not all such rules will be relevant to space weapons.
43. Id. art. II. The term “widespread” has been interpreted as “encompassing an area
on the scale of several hundred square kilometres,” while “long-lasting” would involve “lasting for a period of months, or approximately a season” and effects are “severe” if they
involve “serious or significant disruption or harm to human life, natural and economic resources or other assets.” 1 Committee on Disarmament, Report of the Conference of the
Committee on Disarmament, U.N. Doc. A/31/27, at 91 (1976), reprinted in THE LAWS OF
ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 13, at 168.
44. PETER ROWE, DEFENCE, THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS: MILITARY LAW AND THE
LAW OF WAR 117 (1987).
45. Committee on Disarmament, supra note 43, at 92, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICTS, supra note 13, at 168.
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In assessing which rules may be relevant, however, it should be remembered
that outer space weapons, as understood for the purposes of the present
article, include weapons located in orbit and elsewhere in outer space that
have their effects on or under the earth’s surface or in the airspace above it.
While it is appreciated that there are cost and reliability issues that may render the development of such capabilities unlikely, they should, nevertheless,
in the interests of achieving as comprehensive an analysis as possible, be
considered. Some weapons prohibitions apply only to States that are party
to a relevant treaty, and this is noted where applicable.
A. Poisons and Gases
Dating from the late Middle Ages, the prohibition of the use of poison or
poisoned weapons is reflected in the Lieber Code,46 the Brussels Declaration47 and the Oxford Manual,48 achieving modern treaty law status in the
Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907.49 It is a customary law prohibition that
binds all States in both international and non-international armed conflicts.50
Poison or poisoned weapons covers weapons whose primary, or even
exclusive, effect is to poison or asphyxiate.51 The prohibition would therefore extend to using any substance to aggravate a wound and to the poisoning of wells, pumps and rivers from which the enemy draws water supplies.52
Accordingly, and as an example, the firing from space of a weapon the payload of which is designed to poison the water in a reservoir or irrigation
system would be a breach of this prohibition.
It is prohibited to employ asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, all
analogous liquids, materials or devices and bacteriological methods of warfare. After the failure of Hague Declaration 2 of 1899 to prevent extensive

46. Lieber Code, supra note 26, art. 16.
47. Brussels Declaration, supra note 13, art. 12.
48. INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE L AWS OF WAR ON LAND [OXFORD
MANUAL], art. 8(a) (1880), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 13, at
29.
49. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 15, art 23(a).
50. CIHL, supra note 20, r. 72.
51. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 17, ¶ 111.
52. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 170–71 (Ronald F. Roxburgh
ed., 3d ed. 2005); CIHL, supra note 20, at 253; COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, supra note
40, ¶ 1419.
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use of asphyxiating gas during World War I, the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol 53
was adopted. The Protocol prohibited the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, of all analogous liquids, materials or devices and of
bacteriological methods of warfare. Thus, it would be prohibited to employ
outer space weapons that are intended, for example, to operate on the earth’s
surface by deploying asphyxiating or other poisonous gases or by employing
bacteriological methods of warfare. This prohibition applies to all States in
connection with both international and non-international armed conflicts.
B. Fragmentation Weapons
Adopted under the aegis of the Conventional Weapons Convention,54 Protocol I provides that “it is prohibited to use any weapon the primary effect
of which is to injure by fragments which in the human body escape detection
by x-rays.”55 It follows from this provision that the use of any space weapon
that is designed for anti-personnel use and that primarily injures by the infliction of fragments that cannot be detected by X-ray is prohibited.
C. Laser Weapons
Adopted under the same Convention, Protocol IV56 prohibits the employment of “laser-weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function
or as one of their combat functions, to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision, that is, to the naked eye or to the eye with corrective eyesight
devices.”57 The Protocol draws an important distinction between laser weapons that are specifically designed as a combat function to cause permanent
blindness and “[b]linding as an incidental or collateral effect of the legitimate
military employment of laser systems, including laser systems used against

53. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S.
65.
54. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137.
55. Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168.
56. Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, Oct. 13, 1995, 1380 U.N.T.S. 370.
57. Id. art. 1. “‘[P]ermanent blindness’ means irreversible and uncorrectable loss of vision that is seriously disabling with no prospect of recovery. Serious disability is equivalent
to visual acuity of less than 20/200 Snellen measured using both eyes.” Id. art. 4.
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optical equipment.”58 This latter incidental or collateral kind of blinding “is
not covered by the prohibition of this Protocol.”59 However, the treaty does
require that in the employment of laser systems, States party must “take all
feasible precautions to avoid the incidence of permanent blindness to unenhanced vision,” and such precautions should include training and other practical measures.60
The important points here from a space weapons perspective are:
1. the mere fact that a space laser weapon is capable of causing incidental or collateral permanent blindness does not per se render it
unlawful;
2. a space laser weapon that is specifically designed to cause temporary
blindness or to dazzle as a combat function is not rendered unlawful
by this provision;
3. when employing space laser weapons to which (1) or (2) above applies, all practicable precautions should be taken to avoid causing
permanent blindness, including training and precautions at the time
of use; and
4. space laser weapons that are designed to cause damage to other objects or vehicles, whether in outer space, airspace or on the earth’s
surface, or which are designed to perform measurement, range-finding or other military tasks, but that do not have a combat function
to cause permanent blindness, are not prohibited by this treaty rule.
D. Chemical Weapons
While the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol prohibited the use of chemical weapons, it did not prohibit their possession. The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention61 addresses that shortcoming. It is an arms control treaty by which
is meant that it goes beyond mere prohibition of use by also banning the
development, production, acquisition, stockpiling or retention of chemical
weapons or their direct or indirect transfer to anyone. States party must not

58. Id. art. 3.
59. Id.
60. Id. art. 2.
61. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45.
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prepare to use them or assist, encourage or induce anyone to do any of these
things.62
Under the Chemical Weapons Convention, “chemical weapons” are
toxic chemicals and their precursors and equipment and munitions connected with their use.63 “Toxic chemicals” are any chemicals, whatever their
origin and however or wherever produced, “which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals.”64 A “precursor” is “[a]ny chemical reactant which takes part at any stage in the production, by whatever method of
a toxic chemical.”65 Toxic chemicals and precursors that are intended for
purposes not prohibited under the Convention may be developed, possessed
and used, but only if the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes.66
The purposes which are not prohibited under the Convention consist of
industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful
purposes; protective purposes, namely those purposes directly related to protection against toxic chemicals and to protection against chemical weapons;
military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons and not
dependent on the use of the toxic properties of chemicals as a method of
warfare; and law enforcement, including domestic riot control purposes. 67
Law enforcement in this context refers to the enforcement of domestic law.68
The prohibitions as to use and possession of chemical weapons now reflect customary law with the result that they bind all States, irrespective of
their participation in the Convention, in both international and non-international armed conflicts.69 It follows from this that no State may use space
weapons that come within the definition of chemical weapons. If, for example, a space weapon system were to be developed that through its chemical action on life processes located on the surface of the earth causes death,
temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals, such a
62. Id. art. I(1).
63. See id. art. II(1).
64. Id. art. II(2).
65. Id. art. II(3).
66. For the precise definition, see id. art. II(1).
67. Id. art. II(9).
68. David P. Fidler, The Meaning of Moscow: “Non-Lethal” Weapons and International Law in
the 21st Century, 87 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 525, 540–44 (2005).
69. See CIHL, supra note 20, r. 74. There are now 192 States party to the Chemical
Weapons Convention. Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, ICRC, https://ihl-databases.
icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/553?OpenDocument (last visited May 11, 2017).
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weapon would be prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention and
under customary law. The affected humans or animals may be located on
land, at sea or on other waters or, less realistically perhaps, in airspace.
E. Biological Weapons
It will be recalled that the 1925 Geneva Protocol banned bacteriological warfare.70 This did not, however, prevent the accumulation of stockpiles of bacteriological weapons. That shortcoming was not addressed until the adoption of the Biological Weapons Convention.71 Article I prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention (1) of “microbial
or other biological agents or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic,
protective or other peaceful purposes,” and (2) of “weapons [or] equipment
. . . designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed
conflict.”72 The Fourth Review Conference in 1996 agreed this has the effect
of also prohibiting the use of such weapons,73 although that would, of course,
be a moot point for States that were already party to the 1925 Protocol.
The broad selection of activities that are prohibited by the Convention
makes it clear that it is another arms control treaty, the prohibitions of which
apply to both international and non-international armed conflict. It has been
ratified by almost all militarily significant States and the consistent practice
of States shows that the prohibitions on possession and use of such weapons, and probably the other prohibitions set forth in the Convention, are
now customary and therefore bind all States in relation to both international
and non-international armed conflicts.74
It is therefore unlawful for any State, whether it is party to these Conventions or not, in any way to equip itself for or undertake a chemical or
biological attack using space assets alone or, for that matter, in combination
with any other method. Accordingly, no State may develop, produce, stockpile, acquire, retain or use any space weapon or space capability that uses, or
70. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S.
65.
71. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26
U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163.
72. Id. art. I.
73. See UK MANUAL, supra note 11, at 104 n.8.
74. See CIHL, supra note 20, r. 73.
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that contributes in any way to the use, of toxic chemicals or their precursors
or microbial or other biological agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in
an armed conflict. This prohibition will also apply to the use of viruses.
F. Incendiary Weapons
Not all provisions of the law relating to weapons consist of prohibitions.
Some provisions are expressed as restrictions on the lawful circumstances in
which a particular class of weapon may be used. Incendiary weapons are a
case in point. Protocol III75 to the Conventional Weapons Convention defines incendiary weapons as “any weapon or munition which is primarily
designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn injury to persons through the
action of flame, heat, or a combination thereof, produced by a chemical reaction of a substance delivered on the target.”76
The Protocol provides that “[i]t is prohibited in all circumstances to
make any military objective located within a concentration of civilians the
object of attack by air-delivered incendiary weapons.”77 It is also prohibited
to make military objectives located within a “concentration of civilians”78 the
object of attack using incendiary weapons other than air-delivered incendiary
weapons
except when such military objective is clearly separated from the concentration of civilians and all feasible precautions are taken with a view to limiting the incendiary effects to the military objective and to avoiding, and in
any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians
and damage to civilian objects.79

Furthermore, the Protocol prohibits making forests or other kinds of
plant cover the object of attack using incendiary weapons except when such
75. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, Oct.
10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 171.
76. Id. art. 1(1). The definition notes that such weapons can take a variety of forms, but
excludes munitions with incidental incendiary effects, such as tracers or illuminants, smoke
or signaling systems and combined effects munitions in which the incendiary effect is designed to be used against objects not persons.
77. Id. art. 2(2).
78. A “concentration of civilians” may be permanent or temporary, and can include
inhabited parts of cities, towns, villages, camps, columns of refugees or groups of nomads.
Id. art. 2.
79. Id. art. 2(3).
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natural elements are used to cover, conceal or camouflage combatants or
other military objectives, or have themselves become military objectives.80
The difficult question that arises from this is which kinds of weapon that
might be used in or from outer space would be caught by the incendiary
weapon definition. Clearly, if an inflammable substance were to be deployed
from outer space against a target on land, the prohibition of attacking military objectives located within concentrations of civilians using air-delivered
incendiaries would become relevant. The prohibition would also be relevant
if an aircraft, whether piloted or remotely piloted, uses space-based facilities
to enable it to prosecute such an attack. If, alternatively, a powerful laser not
prohibited by Protocol IV were to be deployed to outer space for use, inter
alia, against targets on the earth’s surface, the important questions to consider under Protocol III would be whether the laser is primarily designed to
set fire to objects or to burn persons. The next question would be whether
the weapon is designed to do this through the action of flame, heat or a
combination of the two; and, the third question to ask is whether this effect
is produced by a chemical reaction of a substance delivered to the target.
Much will depend on the particular weapon being assessed, but the present
author considers that even if the first two of these questions is answered in
the affirmative, the third is not likely to be. In all probability there will not
be a “substance” delivered to the target and the effect on the target is likely
to be occasioned directly by the directed energy in the laser beam, not
through any kind of chemical reaction. Nevertheless, these and other factors
should be considered carefully when any such space weapon that is being
designed for purposes of the sort discussed above is being evaluated in a
weapon review.81
G. Nuclear Weapons
In international law there is no specific prohibition on, nor any explicit permission for, the use of, or threats to use, nuclear weapons. Any such use or
threat is unlawful unless it complies with the general principles of international law and the rules of the law of armed conflict.
The International Court of Justice considered these matters and in July
1996 issued its comprehensive advisory opinion as to the legality of the threat
or use of nuclear weapons. It came to the conclusion that there is in neither
80. Id. art. 2(4).
81. See Part VII.
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customary nor in conventional international law any specific authorization
for the threat or use of nuclear weapons, but neither is there in either customary or conventional international law any comprehensive and universal
prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.
The Court noted that a threat to use, or use of, nuclear force that is contrary to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and that fails to meet the requirements
of Article 51 is unlawful, and that such a threat or use should be compatible
with the law of armed conflict and with treaties and other undertakings dealing expressly with nuclear weapons.82 Having acknowledged that the threat
or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the law of armed
conflict, the Court stated that it could not “conclude definitively whether the
threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme
circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of a state would be
at stake.”83
There has been no shortage of criticism of this non liquet judgment by the
Court,84 but the propositions in the judgment, unsatisfactory as some commentators consider them to be, will remain the position of the Court on the
matter unless and until the issue is further adjudicated. Accordingly, the possession of nuclear weapons as such does not breach any specific rule under
the law of armed conflict. States are, however, bound by any other relevant
treaties to which they are party such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty.85 Of more specific relevance in the context of outer space, the Outer
Space Treaty86 includes specific provision in respect of nuclear weapons and
weapons of mass destruction, which will be discussed in Part VI below.
A number of States ratified API subject to a statement to the effect that
the new rules introduced by the treaty would not apply to nuclear weapons.87
82. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 17.
83. Id. at 267.
84. See, e.g., Timothy L. H. McCormack, A Non Liquet on Nuclear Weapons – The ICJ
Avoids the Application of General Principles of International Humanitarian Law, 316 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 76 (1997); Christopher Greenwood, The Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons and the Contribution of the International Court to International Humanitarian
Law, 316 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 65, 73 (1997).
85. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483,
729 U.N.T.S. 161.
86. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 610 U.N.T.S.
205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
87. See, for example, the statement made by the United Kingdom on ratification of
API on January 28, 1998 [hereinafter UK Statement], the first statement made by Belgium
on ratification of API on May 20, 1986, the first statement by Italy on ratification of API
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The specific rules that were considered to be covered by these declarations
were not explicitly specified, but are generally recognised as including the
environmental protection rules in Articles 35(3) and 55 and the prohibition
on taking reprisals against civilians and civilian objects. The present author
has in the past argued that they also include the indiscriminate weapons principle.88 The proportionality and discrimination rules89 do, however, apply to
any use of nuclear weapons, but there is no evidence that the relevant States
have resiled from their declarations as they apply to the environmental protection, and potentially to the indiscriminate weapons rules. The lawfulness
of taking the reprisal action addressed in API will depend on the position
taken by the relevant State when ratifying that treaty.90
States that do not have nuclear weapons are bound under Article II of
the Non-Proliferation Treaty not to receive the transfer from any transferor
whatsoever of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices or of control
over them, and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of
such weapons or explosive devices.91
VI.

SPACE LAW’S RULES RELATING TO WEAPONS

The treaty law explicitly dealing with weapons in outer space and with the
conduct of armed conflict there is relatively sparse. Article III of the Outer
Space Treaty does, however, provide that all uses of outer space must be “in
accordance with international law.”92 This is an important provision because
it has the clear effect, in the context of the present article, of applying to
space weapons the customary principles and rules of weapons law and those
of its treaty rules that can sensibly be interpreted as extending to outer space.
on February 27, 1986, and statement 2 made by France on ratification of API on April 11,
2001. Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, ICRC, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl (follow
“Additional Protocol (I) to the Geneva Conventions, 1977” hyperlink then “State parties”
hyperlink then “Reservation/Declaration” hyperlink for each country) (last visited May 11,
2017).
88. WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 65 (2d ed.
2016); see also Frits Kalshoven, Arms, Armaments and International Law, 191 RECUEIL DES
COURS 236, 287 (1985-II).
89. API, supra note 16, arts. 51(5)(b) and 51(4), respectively.
90. Consider in that regard the statement made by the United Kingdom on ratification
of API on January 28, 1998. UK Statement, supra note 87.
91. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons art. II, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T.
483.
92. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 86, art. III.
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The application of the superfluous injury/unnecessary suffering and indiscriminate weapons principles, so far as that application makes sense, is not
controversial. The environment-related rules will apply, as has been seen, to
any space-based weapons that have effects in airspace, on the earth’s surface
or beneath it. Likewise, Part V has addressed the ad hoc rules of weapons
law that are potentially relevant to space weapons.
In so far as it is relevant to the present discussion, Article IV of the Outer
Space Treaty requires States parties
not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons
or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons
on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other
manner. . . . [and states that] the . . . testing of any type of weapons . . . on
celestial bodies shall be forbidden.93

Bourbonnière and Lee explain that this provision would not prohibit the use
of conventional space weapons that have a nuclear power source as these are
not weapons of mass destruction as understood in the treaty.94 This provision does not prohibit the deployment of conventional weapons95 in outer

93. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 86, arts. IV(1)–(2). The establishment of military
bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons, and the conduct
of military maneuvers are prohibited on the moon and other celestial bodies. Conventional
weapons and military space stations can be placed in orbit and space-based exercises and
weapons testing are permitted in outer space but not on celestial bodies. Schmitt, supra note
3, at 104. So, for example, testing a weapon against a satellite would not breach Article IV
of the Outer Space Treaty. But see Treaty Banning Nuclear Testing in the Atmosphere,
Oceans and Outer Space art. 1, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480
U.N.T.S. 43.
94. Contrast this with a weapon system that relies on nuclear weapons to generate
power. Michel Bourbonnière & Ricky J. Lee, Legality of the Deployment of Conventional Weapons
in Earth Orbit: Balancing Space Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, 18 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 873, 881–82 (2008).
95. Id. at 875 n.84. “Conventional weapons” is used here to refer to weapons that are
not nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction. Compare this with the draft Prevention of the Placement of Weapons Treaty submitted in 2008 by Russia and China to the
Conference on Disarmament, which provided
The States Parties undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying any
kinds of weapons, not to install such weapons on celestial bodies and not to place such
weapons in outer space in any other manner; not to resort to the threat or use of force
against outer space objects; and not to assist or induce other States, groups of States or
international organizations to participate in activities prohibited by this Treaty.
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space nor does it prohibit nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction
entering outer space as part of the trajectory of an intercontinental ballistic
missile.96 The provision does, however, prohibit the stationing of biological
and bacteriologic weapons, of chemical weapons and of nuclear weapons in
outer space and the placing of such weapons in orbit. Accordingly, the term
“weapons of mass destruction” must be taken to include chemical weapons
under the Chemical Weapons Convention and biological or bacteriological
weapons under the Biological Weapons Convention.
There is an obligation to register space objects97 and to mark appropriately such objects used for military purposes, but Bourbonnière and Lee
draw attention to the danger that the information that must be disclosed
under Article IV of the Registration Convention may be used for targeting
purposes.98 Nevertheless, this is an obligation to which attention should be
drawn if a space vehicle is the subject of a weapon review.
VII.

WEAPON REVIEWS OF SPACE WEAPONS

International law requires every State to determine whether the employment
by it of a new weapon would in some or all circumstances breach the rules
of international law applicable to that State. This is an implied rule derived
from a number of other legal rules to which States are subject. Consider in
this regard the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration,99 Article 1 of Hague Convention II of 1899100 and Article 1 of Hague Convention IV of 1907.101 The
latter provisions require States party to issue instructions to their armed land
Letter dated February 12, 2008 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation and the Permanent Representative of China to the Conference on Disarmament addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the Russian and Chinese
texts of the Draft “Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and
of the Threat or use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT)” introduced by the
Russian Federation And China, Doc. CD/1839 (Feb. 29, 2008).
96. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 37, ¶ 14.10.3.1. Contrast this with the reference to a fraction of an earth orbit in certain arms reduction treaties. Id.
97. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space art. II, Jan. 14,
1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15.
98. Bourbonnière & Lee, supra note 94, at 895; see id. at 896–98.
99. Note in particular the final paragraph of the St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note
21.
100. Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 1,
July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403.
101. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 1, Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539.
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forces “in conformity with the Regulations” annexed to those instruments. 102
Common Article 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions specifies the obligation
of States to respect, and to ensure respect, for the Conventions, and the
terms in which a number of weapon treaties are written imply a continuing
requirement for States to satisfy themselves that the weapons they acquire
and use comply therewith. The International Committee of the Red Cross
suggests that “[t]he requirement that the legality of all new weapons, means
and methods of warfare be systematically assessed is arguably one that applies to all States, regardless of whether or not they are party to Additional
Protocol 1.”103 The present author takes the view that the requirement confronting States that are not party to API is limited to the legal review of new
weapons. While relatively few States are known to have systems for the legal
review of new weapons,104 even fewer States are known actually to conduct
legal reviews of methods of warfare.
States that are party to API are subject to a rather more extensive obligation. They are obliged “[i]n the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare . . . to determine whether
its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this
Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the High
Contracting Party.”105
The law that should be applied during these weapon reviews includes the
principles and rules that were discussed in Parts III–VI to the extent that
those rules bind the State in question. Thus, the criteria to be applied in order
to determine the lawfulness of a new space weapon system will consist of
102. See, e.g., W. Hays Parks, Conventional Weapons and Weapons Reviews, 8 YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 55, 55–57 (2005). There it is noted that an important State not party to API, the United States, legally reviews the new weapons that it
acquires and has done so for many years.
103. International Committee of the Red Cross, A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare: Measures to Implement Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977,
88 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 931, 933 (2006) [hereinafter ICRC Guide]
(emphasis in original). See also AMW MANUAL, supra note 7, r. 9; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS, supra note 37, r. 110(a)
(noting that the commentary to Rule 110(a) cites Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949); UK MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶¶ 6.20-6.20.1; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK,
supra note 11, ¶ 5.3.4; CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF (CANADA), B-GJ-005-104/FP-021,
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS ¶ 530 (2001);
FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (GERMANY), ZDV 15/2, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
MANUAL ¶ 405 (2013).
104. ICRC Guide, supra note 103, at 5.
105. API, supra note 16, art. 36.
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the rules of international law that bind the State in question, namely the customary principles and rules supplemented by rules set forth in the treaties to
which the State is party.
For States party to API, the obligation to review the lawfulness of a space
weapon, means or method of warfare in outer space first arises with its study.
“Study” is probably best understood as including the first consideration or
evaluation of particular kinds of weaponization of a technology.
“Development,” as that term is used in Article 36 of API, includes the
actual creation of the space weapon and its improvement, refinement and
testing,106 while “acquisition” of space weapons includes obtaining them
from commercial undertakings and/or from other States. The “adoption” of
a method of space warfare seems to contemplate a State or its armed forces
deciding to use a space weapon or method of space warfare in military operations.107
When a State undertakes a weapon review, it should consider the general
circumstances in which it is intended to use the weapon, means or method
of warfare, and should assess whether existing law, that is the body of international law by which the relevant State is bound, prohibits the use of the
weapon or method, or restricts those general intended circumstances of use.
If the latter is the case, the document that contains the weapon review should
specify the legal limitations on the lawful use of the weapon or method.
There is no international law rule that requires that the weapon review
have any particular form, nor is there any particular procedure that the
weapon review process must follow. In some cases, advice to an appropriate
commander, whether oral or written, may, depending on the circumstances,
be sufficient.108
It is therefore clear that any State that is acquiring a space weapon must
conduct a legal review of that weapon to determine whether the principles
and rules discussed in this article prohibit the use of that weapon or restrict
its circumstances of lawful use. States that are party to API must undertake
a weapon review when a space weapon is being studied and/or when it is
being developed. API States must also conduct a legal review into any new
106. See Isabelle Daoust, Robin Coupland & Rikke Ishoey, New Wars, New Weapons?
The Obligation of States to Assess the Legality of Means and Methods of Warfare, 84 INTERNATIONAL
REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 345, 348 (2002).
107. See supra Part II for an explanation of the terms “weapon,” “method of warfare”
and “means of warfare.”
108. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS, supra note 37, at 465 ¶ 4.
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method of space warfare that they are studying, developing and/or that they
plan to adopt.
The criteria that should be applied in such a legal review are as follows:




Is the weapon system of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering?
Is the weapon system indiscriminate by nature?
For States that are party to API, is the weapon intended, or may it
be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to
the natural environment?
For States that are not party to API, is the use of the weapon going
to be consistent with the State’s obligation to have due regard to the
natural environment?
For States that are party to ENMOD, would the use of the weapon
involve environmental modification techniques of the sort and involving the consequences prohibited by the ENMOD Convention?
Are there ad hoc weapons law rules that apply to the weapon?

VIII.

APPLYING THE RULES TO PARTICULAR SPACE TECHNOLOGIES






In this Part, the weapon review criteria that have been identified at the end
of Part VII will be applied to some representative space weapon capabilities
with a view to identifying which among them seem likely to be most relevant
when conducting a legal review of these particular types of weapons. The
weapon technologies that will be considered are, inevitably, expressed in generic terms, but are intended to constitute a reasonably representative sample
of the types of space weapon that States may be expected to procure.
A. Kinetic Anti-Satellite Operations
The first kinds of weapon to be addressed are those associated with kinetic
anti-satellite (ASAT) operations. These may, for example, involve the use of
fixed or mobile direct ascent ASAT launchers, frequently rockets, to deliver
an attack vehicle to the target satellite; the placement in orbit of an interceptor vehicle that subsequently attacks the target satellite; or the release of a
cloud of pellets into the path of the satellite.109 In the case of interceptor
109. Space basing is considered to be unsuitable for ballistic defense using kinetic interceptors, partly owing to the expense and partly due to intrinsic vulnerabilities that would
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operations, other systems track the target satellite communicating the required data to the interceptor vehicle, which then homes in on the satellite.
Assuming that in all of these kinds of kinetic operation the space weapon
system is intended to damage or otherwise degrade a target satellite, certain
aspects of the weapon review criteria will likely be of little or no relevance.
If, as seems likely, no injury or suffering to persons is being caused by the
operation of the weapon, the superfluous injury/unnecessary suffering principle will not require detailed consideration. Similarly, if the environment of
the earth is not being damaged as a result of the operation and if the environment is not being used as a weapon, the environmental protection rules
are unlikely to be relevant to the weapon review. There is, moreover, no ad
hoc rule of weapons law that prohibits or restricts the use of kinetic ASAT
weapons of the kind being discussed here.
The indiscriminate weapons principle is, however, likely to require careful consideration. There are likely to be two aspects to the matter. The first
concerns the ability of the weapon system considered as a whole, including
the persons who are operating the weapon system, to verify that the chosen
target is, and at the time of attack remains, a military objective. The second
concerns the ability of the weapon system, including those who are operating
the system, to take the precautions required by targeting law, including their
ability to determine whether the attack on the target satellite may be expected
to cause injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or a combination
thereof which is excessive in relation to the anticipated concrete and direct
military advantage.
The weapons law issues here are not whether a particular attack will, or
will not, engage a military objective or comply with the proportionality rule.
Rather, the issues are whether the space weapon system as a whole, incorporating as it will the persons involved in its operation, is capable of (a) verifying that the target space vehicle, e.g., a satellite, is a military objective; (b)
applying the precautions in attack prescribed by the law of targeting;110 and
(c) making the determinations required by the proportionality rule. Making
the required determinations presupposes that sufficient knowledge can be
gained as to the uses to which the target satellite is put for those operating
the space weapon system to have the practical possibility to make that proportionality judgment. The obligation to take constant care will require that
allow an attacker readily to negate its defensive capability. WRIGHT, GREGO & GRONLUND,
supra note 1, at 7. Releasing a cloud of pellets in the path of the target satellite may prove
less effective than the other methods of kinetic attack. Id. at 10.
110. See API, supra note 16, art. 57.
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the weapon system or those operating it shall be able to review the status of
the target as a military objective and the proportionality of the planned attack
up to the point when the attack is initiated, and for as long thereafter as
suspension of the attack remains technically and practically feasible.111
Kinetic interceptors that destroy a satellite by explosion or direct impact
may be expected to cause debris, which, if the event occurs at altitudes
greater than the lower end of low earth orbit, may be expected to create a
cloud of debris that is unlikely to leave orbit for the foreseeable future. It
will be appreciated that the proportionality rule refers to expected injury to
civilians and damage to civilian objects. The extent, density and location of
the cloud, and its expected movements over time, are likely to determine
whether such damage can be expected. Moreover there is no specific rule
explicitly prohibiting kinetic ASAT attacks. However, the growing debris
problem that is being experienced causes one to wonder for how long kinetic
ASAT activities will continue to be acceptable among spacefaring nations.
The author takes the view that kinetic ASAT operations that are likely to
cause debris clouds in areas of outer space that civilian satellites may be expected to use are likely to be regarded as breaching the indiscriminate attacks
rule, a factor to which attention should be drawn in any weapon review.
B. Missile Defense Operations
Missile defense operations involve the detection, tracking and targeting of
enemy missiles. Space-based systems may be used for the detection and
tracking elements in the process, but the engagement of the missiles seems
likely to involve ground-based missile systems or ground-based lasers. As
these operations essentially involve the use of a space weapon system to attack and destroy missiles in outer space, for essentially similar reasons to
those noted in the discussion of ASAT operations, the superfluous injury/unnecessary suffering principle is unlikely to be particularly relevant to
the weapon review. The space weapon is being used to counter the threat
posed by the enemy’s weapon systems and is not likely, it is suggested, to
involve environmental modification techniques. On the assumption that as
some of the debris from such operations reaches the earth is unlikely to cause
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment, the environmental protection rules would also seem to be of little or no relevance to a
111. “In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the
civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.” Id. art. 57(1).
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weapon review. There are no ad hoc weapons rules under the law of armed
conflict that apply to technology of this kind. States will, of course, have to
review their obligations under arms reduction/limitation and disarmament
treaties to ensure that those obligations are complied with. Indeed, that is a
matter of general application to space capabilities that are addressed by the
relevant treaties.
As was the case with ASAT operations, the focus of attention in a
weapon review of a missile defense capability is likely to be on the indiscriminate weapons principle. The space weapon system will be designed specifically to locate, track and engage objects that are military objectives, e.g., enemy missiles and rockets. It is therefore most unlikely that a weapon review
would find that such a system that in testing is found to engage the intended
targets with acceptable reliability is nevertheless indiscriminate. Put another
way, if the weapon system performs its assigned military task with the required efficiency, it is likely to pass the indiscriminate weapons test.
The weapon review should, however, consider all relevant aspects of the
matter fully. So if, for example, such systems are being set up to address
threats from foreseen localities, the weapon review should recommend that
feasible precautions should be taken to seek to limit the exposure of densely
populated areas to dangers arising from falling debris. Testing of the space
weapon system in advance of procurement should be designed to show that
it will reliably only engage objects that are military objectives and does not,
for example, mistakenly target civilian aircraft. This may require the careful
configuration of any automated or autonomous target recognition systems,
the facilitation of appropriate human supervision of the operation of the
system if this is necessary to ensure that only lawful targets are engaged, and
the practical ability of a human operator to intervene if necessary. Realistic
testing, both by means of live firing and computer modelling, of the performance of these functions will be an essential element in support of the review. As has been made clear, if the weapon systems forming part of a missile
defense system are capable of engaging objects that are military objectives,
they will likely satisfy the indiscriminate weapons principle. Any operating
procedures or caveats as to their permitted circumstances of operation that
are required to ensure that their use is discriminating will have to be spelled
out in the weapon review and must be implemented by those operating such
systems.
Kinetic interception operations of this kind are likely to produce debris.
It is, however, only the debris that will enter and remain in orbit that will
contribute to the space debris problem discussed earlier. If, as seems likely,
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the debris resulting from such interception operations does not achieve the
required velocities to enter orbit but may be expected, instead, to enter the
atmosphere, the fact that debris has been caused will not involve the particular indiscriminate weapon considerations that have been discussed above.
C. Jamming
Jamming of targeting or tracking capabilities of missile defense systems is
likely to cause the performance of such systems to be at least degraded, resulting for example in missiles missing their targets. Jamming of positioning,
navigation and timing systems and of satellite communications may have farreaching consequences. Jamming of communications systems may cause the
service to be interrupted, although it may be possible to defeat jamming by
encryption. The points made in this sub-Part will apply equally in the case of
the employment of high-power microwave systems deployed to space in order to adversely affect the operation of a target satellite. If particular considerations only apply to high-power microwave systems, this is made clear.
If, as will usually be the case, most military communications are encrypted, this implies that jamming may have a greater impact on civilian than
on military traffic, depending on the system that is being jammed and the
services it supports. It should be borne in mind, however, that jamming operations that do not cause injury or physical damage are unlikely to be classified as an attack,112 with the consequence that the equipment or capability
employed to undertake such operations will not be classified as a weapon.
However, any such technique that does not cause damage or injury but that
adversely affects enemy military operations or capacity will constitute a
method of warfare and, accordingly, States party to API would be legally
obliged to subject it to weapon review. States not party to API would have
no such obligation.
Turning to the weapon review criteria that must be considered and on
the assumption that jamming operations do not cause any injury or illness to
persons, the superfluous injury/unnecessary suffering test is likely to be of
little or no relevance. In a weapon review of a high-power microwave system,
it will be necessary for the reviewer to assess whether the system will cause

112. An attack is defined by API, Article 49(1) as an “act[] of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence.” API, supra note 16, art. 49(1). Violence has, for
these purposes, been interpreted as involving violent consequences, namely injury or damage.
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injury or suffering to enemy combatants and, if so, whether there is a corresponding military purpose or military utility. It is useless injury or suffering
that is the inevitable consequence of the normal use of the weapon in the
designed or intended manner of use that the rule prohibits. So the reviewer
will require tests to be undertaken to determine whether injury or sickness is
caused by the weapon, how severe that injury or sickness is, and whether the
injury or suffering are unnecessary or superfluous as discussed in Part III.
Jamming is unlikely to have any direct impact on the environment and is
unlikely to use the environment as a weapon, at least not in the sense referred
to in ENMOD. The environmental protection rules discussed in Part IV will
also therefore not be considered further. There are no ad hoc rules of weapons law that affect the conduct of jamming operations. Where the indiscriminate weapons rule is concerned, if the jamming tool is capable of selecting
the frequency, network or node to be jammed and of reasonably limiting its
effects to that frequency, network or node, it is unlikely to be found indiscriminate by nature and is therefore unlikely to breach the rule. The weapon
review may, however, need to draw attention to the need to determine in
advance which other networks, frequencies or nodes are likely to be affected
by the jamming operation. If the effect of the jamming on those would be
to cause injury or damage, then the jamming tool will, on this basis if on no
other, be regarded as a weapon, and use of it occasioning such injurious or
damaging incidental effects would be classified as an attack.
If the jamming has no damaging, injurious or harmful effect and if its
only effect is to cause inconvenience or annoyance, the principle of distinction will not apply and the indiscriminate weapons rule would therefore not
apply to the devices or capabilities used to undertake the jamming. If, however, the jamming does have a damaging or injurious effect, the prohibition
of weapons that are indiscriminate by nature will apply and a weapon review
will need to consider whether the weapon, i.e., the jamming capability, can
be directed at a specific military objective and whether it is feasible for those
conducting such operations to take the precautions required by Article 57 of
API. Although this is a targeting law as opposed to a weapons law point, it
should nevertheless be pointed out that if a jamming system creates effects
consisting of both inconvenience or annoyance and damage or injury, the
damage or injury must be considered in applying the proportionality rule,
whereas the inconvenience and annoyance, whether suffered by combatants
or civilians, can be ignored.
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If the weapon review is assessing a high-power microwave system, the
issue is likely to be whether the system is capable of being directed at a specific military objective, i.e., a satellite, and whether its damaging effects can
reasonably be limited to the military objective. One would rather expect that
the answers to both questions will be in the affirmative. If no damage or
injury is either caused or intended, then the microwave system is not a
weapon, but before adopting such a method of warfare, an API State must
nevertheless conduct a legal review of the system.
D. Satellites
Satellites are frequently used to detect, track and monitor objects on the
earth’s surface, such as ships at sea. Space-based missile warning and communications systems are vital elements in the detection of, and response to,
strategic attack. Moreover, satellites can provide optical and synthetic aperture radar imagery that will be critically important in determining strategic
responses, in making routine targeting decisions, in promoting situational
awareness and generally in the conduct of the conflict. Frequently, such systems will be reviewed as part of a “system of systems,” i.e., the space-based
capability will be part of a greater system that is the subject of the review.
Generally speaking, systems, the function of which is the acquisition of
timely, accurate and reliable information, are not legally controversial as they
tend to promote adherence to the discrimination principle rather than erode
it. They will generally have no injurious effect on enemy personnel, will not
damage the environment or be used as a weapon. There are no ad hoc rules
of the law of armed conflict that prohibit or restrict the use of such technologies.
E. Ground-Based Lasers
The final method of space warfare to be considered is the use of groundbased lasers to cause power loss in satellites that pass over a high-power laser
facility. For the purposes of this final example, it will be assumed that the
loss of power suffered by the satellite may be expected to amount to damage
of it because the capacity for satellites to carry fuel is so limited and because
the restoration of power may be expected to require significant fuel expenditure. As damage is caused, the laser operation will be regarded as an attack
with the consequence that the laser facility must be treated as a weapon by
virtue of the use to which it is put.
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If, as is assumed, the laser system is not being used against enemy personnel, the superfluous injury/unnecessary suffering principle will be of little
or no relevance. Likewise, if the laser system has no measurable effect on the
environment and is not employing environmental modification techniques,
then the environmental protection rules will also be largely irrelevant. The
ad hoc rules that deal with laser weapons are found within the Protocol on
Blinding Laser Weapons, Protocol IV to the Conventional Weapons Convention.113 Article 1 prohibits the employment of “laser weapons specifically
designed, as their sole combat function or as one of their combat functions,
to cause permanent blindness.”114 If, as is likely, the kind of laser system being discussed now is not designed as a combat function to blind, it will not
come within the prohibition in Protocol IV. However, anyone conducting a
weapon review of such a system will wish to draw attention to Article 2,
which requires that in the employment of laser systems, all feasible precautions be taken to avoid causing blindness.115
The main issue to be addressed in a legal review is whether the weapon
is capable of being used in compliance with the principle of distinction.
Clearly, if the weapon were to be operated without reference to the nature,
identity or indeed the nationality of the particular space vehicles that pass
overhead, it may be found to breach the indiscriminate weapons rule. If,
however, other systems monitor which space vehicles will enter the area of
outer space affected by the laser, and if the laser can be switched on and off
as required so that only satellites that are military objectives are exposed to
the effects of the laser, such a system would be capable of discriminating use.
IX.

CONCLUSION

It can be seen from the foregoing discussion that weapons, methods and
means of warfare are regulated by an identifiable body of law comprising
customary principles and rules that bind all States, and treaty rules that bind
the States that are party thereto. It has been shown that Article III of the
Outer Space Treaty applies international law in general to outer space activities, and it seems clear that the law relating to weapons also applies there.
The meanings of the terms “weapon,” “means of warfare” and “method
of warfare” have been explained and the principles and rules that determine
113. See supra note 56.
114. Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons art. 1, Oct. 13, 1995, 1380 U.N.T.S. 370.
115. Id. art. 2.
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their legality have been discussed and, to the extent possible, clarified. Attention has been drawn to the obligation for all States to conduct weapon
reviews in respect of all new weapons and the criteria to be applied during
such weapon reviews have been identified. Those criteria have then been
applied to a representative selection of space weapon capabilities, and the
rules of particular relevance have been noted and explained.
Arguably, Article III of the Outer Space Treaty, which receives relatively
little attention, is one of the most important provisions of space law. By applying international law to all military operations in outer space, that provision ensures that the jus ad bellum as set forth in the UN Charter is applicable
in outer space, that space weapons must comply with weapons law and that
their use must adhere to the law of targeting. Any attempts to weaponize
outer space are restricted by Article IV of the same treaty, but it would be
wrong to pretend that these provisions constitute a comprehensive body of
law or even a safeguard on these matters. Perhaps the best protection of
outer space from weaponization and aggressive war would lie in a tacit acceptance among all States that the hostility that we see all too readily practiced between States on Earth should not be allowed to escape beyond the
atmosphere. The cooperative approach to the use of the International Space
Station might suggest that this is not just an idealist’s dream. Certainly, the
present author fervently hopes that space can remain peaceful, not least because of the potentially dreadful consequences for the earth beneath of a
space war aloft. And to anyone who imagines that a new Outer Space Treaty
would be the solution to all problems, the following thought is offered. It is
sometimes the case that tacit, unwritten, perhaps not even verbalized understandings can be more powerful and better implemented than the most detailed of treaties.
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